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CHAFEE ON LAW AND
FREEDOM OF SPEECH
Roy LECHTRECK*

Z

ECHARIAH CHAFEE has long been one of the country's leading au-

thorities on civil rights. As such, his influence has been, to some
extent, impossible to measure. A brief description of his activities, however, might introduce him to those who are not familiar with his work.
Professor Chafee taught at the Harvard Law School from 1916 to
1950. From 1929 to 1931 he served on the Wickersham Commission
which reported on the prevalence of "third degree" methods in law enforcement. From 1943 to 1947 he served on the Commission on Freedom of the Press. In March, 1948, he was sent to Geneva as one of five

delegates from the United States to the United Nations World Conference on Freedom of Information. In 1952 he received the Stephen
A. Wise Award from the American Jewish Congress for his work in
civil liberties. Before his death in 1957 he had written the following books,
among others: Blessings of Liberty, Free Speech in the United States,
Government and Mass Communications, and The Inquiring Mind.
It is difficult to place the work of Professor Chafee in any particular
school of thought. His firm belief in the common law prevents him
from being classified as a follower of Holmes, Dewey or Maritain. Yet,
his firm belief in the common good as one of the purposes of the state
prevents his being classified as a legalist or positivist. If one were to
coin a phrase for his type of thinking, he might be called a believer in a
"moral-historical progressionism." The two chief elements in this belief
are (1) a belief in the wisdom of the past and (2) a belief in some
type of moral code.
The belief in the wisdom of the past is a belief that our Anglo-Saxon
legal heritage in civil rights is an outgrowth of a long trial-and-error
process, in which unsatisfactory solutions to civil rights problems have
been discarded. This does not, of course, mean that what we now have is

* Instructor of Political Science, Cardinal Glennon College; Instructor, St. Louis
Preparatory Seminary.

11

the best obtainable, for improvements can
always be made. However, the result of
centuries of experimentation cannot be
ignored. There exists a collective wisdom
of mankind that is passed on from generation to generation, which we would do well
to heed.
Chafee's belief in a moral code is not as
explicit as some would like. There is, he
believes, a way in which men should act
that transcends mere expediency. The wisdom of the past is simply man's attempt to
define in practical, not abstract, language
what that code is. As man comes to understand the code's application more thoroughly and as a more thorough application
of that code becomes possible, the wisdom
of the past will be modified accordingly.
What we have then is a continuous interpretation of the moral code which tends to
improve as time goes on.
This leads us directly to the nature of
law. If what has been said is true, then
one cannot hold that the lawmaker concerns himself only with making or discovering the law. If the law is only discovered, then the part that men play in
the process is negligible. If the law is
created, then it is made from nothing-no
natural law or moral code seems to apply.
Chafee describes these two conflicting
views. Concerning the view that law is
only discovered he says:
The law is like a partially explored continent
which is always there and which judges are
gradually mapping out by their decisions.
A particular judge's personality does play a
part but it does not affect the real rules of
the law. It merely influences the accuracy
with which his written opinion describes this
law outside himself, just as one mapmaker
may explore farther than another or record
what he sees with a greater skill. For example, a judge may confuse two legal doctrines that are really distinct, but the law that
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exists somewhere stays the same whatever
the judges do.,
This had been the position of Blackstone
and many others. On the other hand, there
is the position of such men as Holmes and
Austin, described by Chafee in this way:
"The law is like a skyscraper under construction and never finished. The judges
gradually put up some beams as they wish;
the legislators gradually put up other
beams as they wish. All law is built by
human beings including judges." 2 To hold
either one or the other of these beliefs,
according to Chafee, is unrealistic. Each
position has some truth in it. As he says:
The skyscraper theory recognizes the personal element in decisions .... Judges like

to talk as if their decisions were wholly uninfluenced by independent factors. Yet when
they discuss the decisions of a great
judge whom they admire.., they recognize
an element of creativeness in that man's
work. The legal rules which a great judge
declares would be different if they were declared by a lesser man or indeed by some
other great judge. We cannot get outside of
ourselves to do our thinking and each of us
inevitably puts something of himself into the
general principles by which he shapes his
conclusions about a set of facts, even undisputed facts.
On the other hand, law is very much more
than the fiat of any single judge or group of
judges.... If it were only that, citizens would
have little reason for submitting to the rules
of the common law except the fear of punishment for disobedience. For the most part,
men obey the law without litigation or accept quickly the outcome of litigation because they feel that law is the embodiment
of certain generally recognized norms outside of any single individual. It is their rational recognition of the objective truths
and values in law which mainly impose the
1 Chafee, Do Judges Make or Discover Law?,
AM. PHILOSOPHICAL SOC'Y PROC. 406 (1947).
2

Ibid.
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obligation to obey the law.
Therefore it is legitimate to reconcile the
two sides of this centuries-old controversy
by saying that the judges and legislators
make law out of what they discover, and
that law is the will of [these men] ...
3
to do what is right.

trying

It might be noted here that we are not
discussing such minor governmental regulations as those requiring us to drive on
the right side of the street, to register before voting, or to acquire a building permit
before constructing a home. No one would
question that these are and should be
man-made laws. Rather, we are discussing
the enunciation of such fundamental laws
as those relating to the right to educate and
raise children, the prohibition of libel and
the guarantee of religious liberty. The two
components of this basic law, then, are a
natural law and a legalistic structure built
upon the natural law so that it may be applied and utilized. Both of these elements
must be present.
The accumulated wisdom of the past is
handed down to us primarily in our constitutions. Momentary expediency must
never usurp the more basic principles of
governmental life. For Chafee, "short time
aims of the people and their elected representatives must give way before the long
time aims of the people as found in the
Constitution."14 The law is more than the
present expression of the will of the people. He agrees with Burke that government is "a partnership between those who
are living, those who are dead, and those
5
who are to be born."
Professor Chafee is far from propound-

3 Id. at 419-20.
4 Chafee, Charles Evans Hughes, 93 AM. PHILOSOPHICAL SOC'Y PROC. 276 (1949).
5 CHAFEE, THE BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY 50 (1956).

ing a new idea. His is basically a reiteration of our common-law background without the historical limitations of the common law. It does not present a merely
philosophical approach to political society,
but rather a practical-philosophic approach. It recognizes that the state can
never be considered abstractly, that is,
apart from its agents, for the agents of the
state directly influence all the actions of
the state. It could conceivably be argued,
for instance, that the state has the power
to censor ideas, if one were to proceed by
abstract reasoning. But when it is realized
that men, not angels, would have to be the
censors, and that men are imperfect creatures, it becomes apparent that the best
policy is for the state to keep "hands-off" the
free flow of ideas. This will be discussed at
greater length later, but the point should
be made that the range of activity that the
state may rightfully engage in is limited
not only by the nature of the state, but also
by the nature of man who must, of necessity, be the agent of the state.
While the state is limited by its own
nature and the nature of its agents, it is
also restricted by the nature of the people
within its jurisdiction. The purpose of law
is to provide for some sort of common good
and to maintain a legal order within existing society. "The people," Chafee once observed, "cannot be legislated into sainthood." Elsewhere he added that "one of
the main values of law is that it crystallizes existing standards of conduct and
makes more people aware of those standards, so that compliance becomes habitual." 6 As a postscript to these remarks it
might be pointed out that the law should

Possible New Remedies for Errors in
the Press, 60 HARV. L. REV. 1, 27-28 (1946).
OChafee,
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be neither arbitrary nor arbitrarily applied.
Chafee is opposed to discrimination,
whether it is based on race, creed, color,
sex or nationality. He is also opposed to
guilt by association and discrimination because of non-conformity to political and
7
social beliefs.
The type of government which Zechariah
Chafee believes is best suited for mankind, at least in the developed West, is a
democracy, since a totalitarian regime is
contrary to natural law. Only in a democracy can totalitarian governments be
avoided. Only the people themselves are
able to determine their own good since
they alone have the necessary collective
wisdom. However, there exist many forms
of democracy. In fact,
the essentials of democracy are plainly compatible with a wide range of political structures-republics or constitutional monarchies . . . nations with a permanent executive officer like our President or executive
officers chosen by the legislature like the
British Cabinet, with or without a written
constitution, with or without judicial power
to invalidate statutes .... s
The collective wisdom of democratic
peoples, however, must not be selfishly
used. It is a trust the electorate holds
for the entire nation.
Since the electorate is always smaller than
the whole body of persons affected by government, it follows that voters, like legislators, are representatives. They do not act
merely for themselves, but for others-the
living who cannot or do not vote, the dead,

7Chafee condemns guilt by association because
an individual is responsible only for those things
he does with his own knowledge. He contends
that a person cannot always know what an organization or another individual stands for. CHAFEE,
FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 470 (1941).
8 CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 59.

CATHOLIC

LAWYER, WINTER

1965

the unborn. The voter, like the legislator
and the officeholder, is a trustee for the public. Like them, he has duties as well as
rights .... 9

In order to make this political system
work, however, the truth must be known,
for without truth democracy will collapse.
"Experience proves," Chafee says, "the
necessity of a constant process of open debate if a free and democratic government
is to function effectively. Satisfactory public opinion in a crisis is impossible unless
both sides can present their contentions.
"..10 For Chafee, the worst thing we can
do in time of war is what we did during
the First World War-gag the people under
the guise of national defense. He cites
dozens of examples of injustices then perpetrated upon the American people in
order to show that the most innocent law
dealing with freedom of speech can, and
will, be interpreted to stifle free speech.
Only through an abundance of inquiring
minds among the people can the baffling
problems of democracy be solved. The first
amendment is much more than a prohibition of legislation against free speech. It
is -also "a declaration of national policy in
favor of the public discussion of all public questions."1 It must be seen as both
a negative and a positive force on the nation. He reminds us also that free speech
"helps us to make up our own minds on
issues about which, previously, we did not
care one way or the other. Suddenly we
realize their importance and the necessity
of taking sides. 1 2 Moreover, every now
and then we need to be stimulated by ideas
which may have become, through the passage of time, unacceptable to us.
9 Id.at 51.
10 CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 415.

11 Id. at 6.
12 CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 5, at 111.
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Just as Socrates went up and down
Athens stinging men's minds into fresh activity about such ideas as "virtue," "knowledge," and "justice," which had become stale
like old hay for want of an occasional turning over . . . so a great writer arouses us
from our dogmatic slumbers and forces us
to reconsider conceptions we and many previous societies have been inclined to take for
13
granted.
Truth, then, is necessary for the proper
functioning of a democracy-not only to
enlighten the people but also to awaken
them. Yet, it is not what certain individuals
in the government believe to be the truth
that is the truth. The truth can only be
known through free and open discussions,
and no man should play the censor.
Chafee's position, as he sees it, is the same
as that of Milton and Mill. The only qualification he places upon free speech is a
very restricted sense of public order which
is based on Holmes' "clear and present
danger" concept. Authoritarian censorship, he believes, is incompatible with free
and open discussions:
It will be enough for me to mention two of
the weaknesses in the authoritarian view.
First, it is almost impossible to find men
with the wisdom and incorruptibility which
are essential for the task of controlling the
minds of everybody else and killing bad
ideas en masse. Second, men in authority
are tempted to identify their own policies
with truth and to make opposing ideas criminal as a means of perpetuating their poli14
cies and their control of the government.
Chafee accepts wholeheartedly the six
ideas of Milton in the Areopagitica: (1)
the chief value of freedom of speech is to
the community; (2) we all run the risk
of condemning good ideas as bad simply

because they are new and strange to us;
(3) the sources of evil are numerous and
many of them cannot be prevented by law
from reaching men even if books are censored; (4) most men are not fit to be censors and the few who are fit will not want
to take on such a repulsive job; (5) few
books are all bad-the censor may ban a
book for a few passages he thinks bad,
thus depriving readers of all the good
parts; and (6) the opportunity of the
reader to sift good from bad is a valuable
part of his education for life. 15
Chafee places his chief emphasis on the
first of these six points and says that the
greatest value of freedom of speech is not
to the minority who want to speak, but
to the majority who do not want to listen.
His remarks about radicals show an extraordinary grasp of human nature.
Men who use revolutionary language should
not be suppressed in the absence of a very
serious and pressing danger, because they
almost always have a grievance. Very few
people want to smash things for the fun of
it like small boys breaking windows.
Whether the grievance is well founded or
not, the defenders of the existing order
ought to know about it so that they may
correct it or show by counter-argument that
it does not exist. The agitator would be
much wiser and more effective if he expressed his case calmly without threats, but
we ought not to punish him for this mistake.
...[H]e is not accustomed to weighing his
words carefully, and he is only too apt in a
heated argument to let himself go. And on
the whole, society gains if he is free to
do so. 6
Once the revolutionaries advocate an idea
that is unacceptable to society at large, the

15 CHAFEE, FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS
13 CHAFEE,
14 CHAFEE,

op. cit. supra note 7, at 546.
op. cit. supra note 5, at 103.

(1955).
16 CHAFEE,

op. cit. supra note 7, at 187.

33-34
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idea itself takes on an unpleasant odor
and any who advocate it are likewise
branded as revolutionaries. "When you put
the hotheads in jail," he writes, "these
cooler people do not get arrested-they
just keep quiet. And so we lose things
they could tell us, which would be very advantageous for the future course of the nation. ' ' 17 Hence, you silence not only the
not-so-wise but also the wise.
Chafee, of course, recognizes that it is
often difficult to abstract truth from argument. But this is due substantially to improper methods. The principle of a market
place of ideas is still sound. It has within
itself a self-correcting process that permits
truth to emerge from the clash of good
and bad opinions. "The assumption," he
writes, "is that free action in rational minds
will result in self-correction. ..
The state should facilitate the attainment
of truth. One of the most important purposes of government is the discovery and
17
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dissemination of truth. But it would be
harmful for the state to be a direct participant in the debates, for once the coercive
power of the state directly or indirectly is
thrown into the argument, "it becomes a
matter of chance whether it is thrown on
the false side or the true, and truth loses
all its natural advantage in the contest." 19
The state, however, can and should do several things. It can prevent monopolies in
mass communication media and it can take
steps to insure a fairer treatment of the
news. But equally important, if not more
so, it should provide meeting places,
whether in municipal auditoriums, schoolhouses, parks, etc., where questions of public importance could be freely discussed.2"
With the best possible knowledge of the
truth that we would thereby obtain, we
could more adequately make laws out of
what we discover, utilizing to the fullest
our moral and historical traditions and
making continued progress on the road of
life.

Id. at 561.

IS 1 CHAFEE,
CATIONS

GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNI-

19ld. at 50.
CHAFEE, op. cit. supra note 7, at 559.

23 (1947).
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OBSCENE LITERATURE
(Continued)

tional description of obscene things, when
this would be rather minute or perversely
detailed, placing the obscene fact amid its
circumstances in so realistic a manner that
the reader could scarcely avoid thinking
about and picturing mentally the things so
narrated,' would be considered as forbid3
den literature.

To narrate (narrant) obscene things
seems to imply some historical sense,
rather than one that is theological or scientific, just as it connotes a treatise of some
length rather than a mere report in some
paper or magazine. 2 Thus any real or fic52 Augustine, VI, 471.

53Ibid., 474; Pernicone, loc. cit.; Wernz-Vidal,
loc. cit.

OBSCENE LITERATURE

The final word in the canon, docent, is
the strongest. "Those books are said to
teach obscene things which impart and explain how lustful actions are performed,
by what means others may be corrupted
'4
and led to satisfy one's wicked desires. ,
This word clearly indicates and delineates
the case of a reader who "deduces false
conclusions from the description or narrative." ' Any book would be condemned
in virtue of this word if it were to introduce
into the narrative some immoral deed or
practice and then proceed to explain or

justify it.5"
56 Burke, p. 37. There are other moralists and
canon lawyers whose definitions of these three
terms agree with what has been presented:
Aertnys-Damen, I, 758; Udalricus Beste, Introductio in Codicem (Collegeville, 1946), p. 707
[=Beste]; J. Brys, Juris Canonici Compendium
(10th ed.; Bruges, 1947-59), II, 218 [=Brys];
Ianuario Bucceroni, Institutiones Theologiae
Moralis (6th ed.; Rome, 1914-15), IV, 315
[=Bucceroni]; Cappello, 11, 485; Merkelbach, I,
601; Benedicto Ojetti, Synopsis Rerum Moralium
et luris Pontificii (ed. altera; Prati, 1905), II,
255, who comments on the meaning of these
words before the formulation and promulgation
of the Code, and thereby shows the continuity

54

Pernicone, Ioc. cit.
,5 Augustine, loc. cit.; see Cappello, loc. cit.

in the meaning these words have had in Church
law; Wernz-Vidal, loc. cit.

FIRST AMENDMENT
(Continued)
obligation was in an "Almighty God" (discovered from the order of the external
world, the principle of cause and effect
and an analysis of the great inner world
of the subjective; not a God who had revealed any specific supernatural truth-the
area of great historic conflict and bloodshed which the Constitution's drafters
sought to avoid).
There is a striking analogy between the
decisions of the Supreme Court in the
early thirties, in the field of economic social justice, and those in the early sixties,
in the sphere of the promotion of the common good by preservation of the ideal of
the sacredness of the individual. In the
early thirties the Court interpreted the Constitution so as to deter the state-by interposing the abstract concept of individual
liberty-from effectuating economic social
justice. Now the Court is preventing the

state from fostering, without coercion or
compulsion, that underlying ideal upon
which economic social justice, as well as
civil rights, rests. A massive public opinion,
however, in the later thirties after the attempt to "pack the Court" had failed,
finally caused the members of the Court
to adopt a sociological legal philosophy.
The analogy will be complete if and when
a correspondingly overwhelming public
opinion is exhibited, sufficient to cause the
Court to apply the natural law philosophy
of the founding fathers in the area of the
first amendment.
It is, of course, more difficult for the
public to become aware of the long range
socially disastrous consequences of the
Engel case, as compared to those cases
which had immediate adverse economic
social consequences. It is submitted, however, that the necessary public opinion will
be generated when the public perceives
the Engel case in its true light-a decision

11
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which must eventually result in total secularism and a rejection of human responsibility, not merely toward the God of revealed religion, the God of reason, but
also toward preserving the immutable, absolute, intrinsic, and transcendental in-

violability of man as distinct in quality
from brute creation. The final issue, therefore, is whether a nation which believes
that man is no different from a baboon, or
a grain of sand, can continue to mainthe free American way of life.

DE JURE INTEGRATION
(Continued)

zation that political democracy means reliance on the representative agencies of
government not only for the measures to
which we are indifferent, but also for those
which we want very badly.
The Supreme Court has thus far declined to review a case that permitted corrective measures"6 and one that refused to
constitutionally compel them. 7 We are
therefore suspended between the extremes
of those who would supplant the responsible political bodies with judicial decree
and those who would straightjacket them
with judicial bonds. I hopefully second the
view of Professor Freund that "there the
matter rests and, in my judgment, is likely
to rest so far as constitutional law is concerned." 64

Professor) Frankfurter: "It must never be
forgotten that our constant preoccupation
with the constitutionality of legislation
rather than with its wisdom tends to preoccupation of the American mind with a
false value. '6 4 Nevertheless it is on this
level that issue has been joined and it is
on this level that the discussion in this article has been premised. To those who
have strong views on the policy of the "balancing" proposals discussed here, I can
only commend an observation made by
Mr. Justice Holmes in dissent that has
now attained the status of a democratic
axiom. He read the guarantee of free
speech and thought as meaning "not free
thought for those who agree with us but
''5
freedom for the thought that we hate." 11
In light of the lessons of our national experience one might hope for a similar reali-

64 FRANKFURTER, LAW AND POLITICS: OCCASIONAL
PAPERS OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 197 (1962).
65

United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644,
(dissenting opinion).

655 (1928)

v. Rubin, 14 N.Y.2d 193, 199 N.E.2d
375, 250 N.Y.S.2d 281, cert. denied, __
U.S.
6,;Balaban

__

(1964).

Bell v. School City of Gary, 213 F. Supp. 819
(N.D. Ind.), afl'd, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964). The case is
extensively reviewed in Kaplan, Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part 111: The Gary Litigation, 59 Nw. U.L. REV. 121 (1964).
68 Freund, Civil Rights and the Limits of Law,
14 BUFFALO L. REV. 199, 205 (1964).
7

